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Enlightenment, Newtonianism and independence in the historiography of Mutis
As early as 1923, the historian of mathematics Florian Cajori complained: "the early history of the mathematical sciences in America, especially in the Latin American colonies, has received little attention at the hands of scientific men." 1 Cajori's complaint still stands for important areas of scientific activities during colonial and subsequent times. Indeed, we are still far from having a somewhat complete panorama of the reception and integration of scientific activities into the colonial life in America, from the conquest to the emergence of the republics in the early and mid-nineteenth century. In fact, the common assertion that the introduction and reception of modern science played a role in the independence of these territories is another story to be told. However, it seems fair to say that historians have been too hasty in depicting scientific activities as an obvious and self-evident aspect of the colonial life, and therefore one to be included among the causes of the separatist sentiment leading to the colonial emancipation. This classical view has its roots in the apocryphal versions of the history of science emerging in the dawn of the independence, put forward by the pupils and acquaintances of the main intellectual figures of the revolutionary processes. During the nineteenth century, this view was incorporated into hagiographic stories of the national heroes, as part of the construction of national identity. In the 1980s and 1990s, Thomas Glick, John Lynch, Anthony McFarlane, and others moderated this view suggesting that modern science had a mere instrumental role for creole scientists that is, science provided the foundation for the development of a creole identity that assimilated the sovereignty over a territory with the first-hand knowledge of it.
This revisionist version relies on the claim that the Bourbon reformism had several unexpected and counterproductive effects over the royal aspirations of deploying its enlightened despotism over the Atlantic World. In fact, this reformism supported the intellectualization and technical training of local creole elites that saw in the Spanish monarchy the cause of the retrograde state of the New World. 3 In the particular case of the northern territories of South America -the Viceroyalty of New Granada-the studies on the introduction of early modern science bear two salient characteristics. Granada's independence process. 5 Put briefly, this revised view claims that scientific endeavors led to a better understanding of natural resources and, in consequence, Spanish Americans realized, by accident, the potential of their territories as independent nations only in a medium-term process. For instance, Peset depicts Mutis as permanently playing a political role when performing his scientific activities. In his opinion, when Mutis arrived from Spain and during the time he planned to go back 4 to Europe, his activities were oriented towards the dominion of locals; conversely, when he decided to settle in America, Peset describes Mutis on the edge of being a promoter of the independence in the minds of his pupils. In consequence, Peset concludes: "He [Mutis] will henceforth be considered the father of Colombian science and independence." 6 Likewise, Frías-Nuñez sets out the problem of understanding the figure of Mutis by considering the features a portrait of Mutis should include and, after mentioning his most celebrated scientific achievements, he adds: "we cannot forget his activities and contributions -and the influence through his contributors -in creating the platform of what shall be the independents' movement in Colombia." 7 Nevertheless, the connections between Mutis' scientific activities -especially the Royal
Botanical Expedition-and the political, economic, and historical events leading to the independence from Spain are far from being obvious. Silva has recently remarked the problems of this misleading view that holds that Mutis' natural researches are but patriotic actions leading to a growing consciousness of national identity among the creoles; this "has favored the convergence between the scientific pantheon and the republican one." 8 This approach has made of Mutis a Colombian national hero. Beyond the well-known problems of doing history of a national hero, these anachronistic and goal-oriented readings of Mutis' activities are deeply rooted in two basics misleading tenets.
Firstly, these readings depend on a now re-evaluated assessment of the role that education and science played in New Granada during the Bourbon Reforms, especially under the reign of Carlos III (1759-1788). It is commonly assumed that Bourbon Reforms led to the Enlightenment -or brought it from France-not only in metropolitan Spain but in the colonial territories as well. Bourbon rulers, in contrast with the Habsburgs, would have tried to modernize the administration of the colonies by promoting science and technical developments in order to improve the exploitation of natural resources and the production of goods for the commerce; thus changing the mining-based economy of the New World. Even those historians of science or ideas who are not centrally concerned with the political situation of the Spanish Empire causally connect the Bourbon's rule with the Spanish 5 Enlightenment. 9 However, historians such as Lynch, Mestre-Sanchis, and Pérez-García have shown how this rhetoric of modernization and enlightenment in Bourbon Spain is part of the propaganda that the new monarchy circulated when they ascended to the throne. For these historians, the introduction of early modern science in Spain came through the works of the so-called novatores, but this does not mean that they have to conform to, or imply a creole identity around the ideals of freedom that became dominant among his students after 1808. In other words, we consider that it is problematic to read Mutis' conception of science either as part of a plot of the Spanish Empire to subdue Americans through knowledge, or as a pro-independent project consisting in a renewed moral attitude leading to nationalism wrapped up in the Newtonian experimental physics, misleadingly equated with the Enlightenment. 6 Central to these approaches is the problematic assumption that the Enlightenment is equivalent or necessarily connected with other historical categories such as Newtonianism. In the case of Mutis, his enthronement in the pantheon of national heroes, his pretended nationalist feelings, his alleged primacy in teaching the "New science" in America, the vindication of his scientific works by the nineteenth-century Colombian scholars as a source of moral autonomy and the emancipation of New
Granada by his defense of the "New science," and the causal connection between the Bourbons' rule and the local enlightenment; all of these imprecise and teleological assumptions have in common a conception of enlightenment now deeply revaluated. 12 In most cases, categories used by the historical actors to represent their activities and works such as "Newtonian philosophy," "New science," and "Modern philosophy" are uncritically borrowed from them; more often than not these adjectives are simply equated with enlightenment, hiding the valuable clues to uncover the specific features of the intellectual atmospheres of the late eighteenth-century New Granada.
Our aim is to set out a characterization of Mutis' appropriation and defense of Newton's experimental physics in New Granada. This -not the "Enlightenment"-is arguably the most enduring Mutisian contribution to the establishment of a view of knowledge shared by the communities that emerged during the second half of the eighteenth century. From a different angle, this paper is a contribution to the recent and growing scholarship on Newtonianism, by considering its reception in the peripheral context of New Granada; this is an effort to document Mutis' most salient ideas about knowledge and natural research as an appropriation of Newton. 13 The introduction of Newton's Principia and Opticks through the visions that figures such as 'sGravesande and Musschenbroek made of these works seems not to have precedents in the young Viceroyalty. Therefore, our intention is to portray Mutis' rich appropriation of Newton as an illustrative case of the reception and development of scientific ideas in the colonial America. This is a first step into a larger project to pinpoint this local setting into a wider and revisionist reading now in course of "The Enlightenment" delineating a new provincialized Newton in New Granada. 
Mutis as an eighteenth-century Newtonian
Before looking in detail at Mutis commitments to Newton's experimental physics, it is necessary to specify the elements implied in portraying Mutis' variety of Newtonianism. For this, we take up some elements from the recent scholarship on Newtonianism. These are (a) the adequacy of the label Newtonian as a historiographical category; (b) Mutis' own sense of the term Newtonian to represent himself and his own activities; and (c) the materialization of Mutis' Newtonianism, that is the specific means by which it was developed, characterized, and presented to specific audiences.
(a) The label Newtonianism is one of the most revised categories of the "Newton industry."
Widely spread during the first half of the last century for describing, in a general way, the acceptance and diffusion of Newton's methodological and theoretical tenets and concepts throughout the 8 eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it helped to construct the image of these centuries as a period in which Newton's approach to natural-philosophical problems constituted the rationality of science par excellence. In the light of these considerations, several eighteenth-century authors from different fields -especially mathematics, natural philosophy, physics, medicine, and theology-from the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Germany, and Italy were characterized as Newtonians, with little regard of the particular conditions under which they knew and used Newton's methodological and theoretical principles.
Nevertheless, since the 1970s, the classical image of Newtonianism as a single, uniform set of principles changed as the outcome of more detailed and specific researches about Newtonian authors. As historians like Schaffer, Ducheyne, and van Besouw argue, the general understanding of Newtonianism is problematic, because it does not account for the particularities of the appropriation of Newton's methodological and theoretical aspects in the different places where they were disseminated during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 15 Thus, by using Newton's tenets and concepts, as well as his methodology for natural philosophy in diverse fields such as physics, medicine, chemistry, theology, geology, or zoology, these areas changed so much that it became impossible to distinguish the Newtonian features without considering them combined with the other traditions belonging to each discipline. Furthermore, Newton's theoretical and methodological principles were blended with local traditions, resulting in the emergence of different Newtonianisms in which authors and conceptions of nature apparently not compatible with Newton's own worldview were synthesized as the effect of the appropriation of Newton's methodology and theories in those different geographical and disciplinary contexts.
In this sense, we studied the specific ways in which Mutis appropriated Newton by analyzing his own definition of what it is to be a Newtonian, rather than assessing Mutis' ideas and including them in a general concept of Newtonianism. We will explore in some detail the ways in which Mutis' developed particular views on knowledge from his own reading of Newton. In this way, we will show 9 that Mutis can be labeled as a Newtonian, not only because he presented an interpretation of Newton's experimental physics, but also because he self-defined as such. As we shall argue, by Newtonianism
Mutis did not mean an inflexible commitment to Newton's claims nor a restriction to study the same topics that Newton did. Indeed, Mutis' conception of the Newtonian philosophy was framed within the idea that God had commanded the King of Spain to exploit the natural resources of America in order to fulfil a divine plane. This being so, Newtonian philosophy is reshaped as a "useful science"
(ciencia útil), pre-eminently including natural history and mineralogy -areas not explored by Newton but widely valued in the New World, in addition to the teaching of Newton's physics and his mathematical approach to nature. The conception of the Newtonian philosophy emerging from this frame of divine commandment constitutes Mutis' expanded views on knowledge, mathematics and observation in Newtonian-inspired ways, but distancing from Newton himself.
It is important to specify that Mutis was not the only one concerned with the usefulness of science and the King's responsibility to promote natural research. Indeed, the utility of science, as part of the relationship between Spain and its colonies was a problem widely recognized in the eighteenth century, as scholars have documented it. 16 However, Mutis' formulation of the usefulness of science and its subsequent identification with Newton's philosophy is unique in his articulation of theological commitments, experimental approach, mathematical exigencies, and the moral duties of the philosopher responsible for the exploration of the "divine treasures." In other words, Mutis' solution to the then pressing problem of the utility of knowledge in the colony and in the Metropolitan Spain came from his appropriation of Newton, in which he saw a natural connection between utility, material progress, truth and religious concerns.
(b) In his lectures, textbooks and in all documents intended to present and defend his views to broad audiences -students, colleagues, local and imperial authorities, the Catholic Inquisition-, Mutis exposed the advantages of the "Newtonian experimental physics" and portrayed himself as a 18 Mutis begins his Elements by explaining the importance of natural philosophy by its utility. According to him, the usefulness of natural philosophy consists in providing the conditions to know God through his providence. Thus, the main merit of natural philosophy "consists in that it is a solid foundation for natural religion and for moral philosophy, leading man in agreeable way to the high knowledge of the author of nature, creator of the universe. Afterwards, Mutis explains that the certainty of this theologically founded study of nature depends on the application of the geometrical method of analysis and synthesis to the study of natural phenomena, just as Newton had described it in the Opticks. In Mutis' words:
In order to proceed with all certainty, and to get over disputes forever, [Newton] always relied on analytical and synthetic methods for the study of nature; so that, after beginning with phenomena or the effects, he moved to the discovery of powers or causes operating in nature. Similarly, he established that from particular causes it was necessary to move up to the more general ones and, from these latter to the most general cause. This is the analytical method. After discovering these causes, it should move down in an opposite order, considering [these causes] as principles already established 12 to explain by mean of them the less general causes and next all phenomena, consequence of [the less general causes]; in this way, the soundness and firmness of explanations are clearly noticed. This is the synthetic method. It can be appreciated that in Physics, as in Mathematics, the investigation of difficult things should proceed with the analytical method, in order to apply the synthetic method afterwards.
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There are several elements in this passage concerning Mutis' presentation of Newton's methodology.
We begin by the final statement. Mutis' presentation of the order in which the methods should be applied is remarkably similar to that of Newton in the "Query" 31 of the Opticks: "As in Mathematicks, so in Natural philosophy, the investigation of difficult things by the method of analysis, ought ever to precede the method of composition." 22 The difficult things that Newton -and by extension Mutis-was talking about were the causes producing natural phenomena which are their visible effects. The difficulty of the investigation relies on the fact that the discovery of causes cannot be achieved by the mere observation of natural phenomena. Conversely, Newton argues that in order to determine the causal connection between a particular phenomenon and its possible cause it is necessary to apply different mathematical procedures. Therefore, he concludes: "By this way of analysis we may proceed from Motions to the Forces producing them; and in general, from effects to their causes, and from particular causes to more general ones, till the argument end in the most general." 23 In this sense, following Newton, Mutis argues that it is necessary to proceed from particular causes to the most general ones, in order to determine the first principles of nature; such an investigation can be only conducted by articulating an experimental approach to nature with a mathematical analysis of the observed phenomena.
Another revealing aspect of the previous quotation is the particular concepts that Mutis used to characterize the results of the method of analysis and synthesis: powers (potencias) and phenomena (fenómenos). Both of them were representative of the main subject of physics as Mutis conceived it under the influence of 'sGravesande and of Mutis concerns regarding the very possibility of being 13 understood by his students. In the manuscript containing Mutis' translation of 'sGravesande's
Physices elementa mathematica -which we shall describe in the next section-, we can see that Mutis conceived natural phenomena in mechanical terms as he defined them as "all movements and all situations of natural bodies not depending immediately from an intelligent being and that are perceptible by our senses." 24 Based on this definition, we can assume that, in Mutis' opinion, the method of analysis allows to discover the causes of the motion of the bodies in nature: their powers, which he called potencias. For Mutis, physics is the study of powers causing the motion of bodies in nature. Thus, he proposed a reformed-mechanical physics, opposed to the Aristotelian physics taught in New Granada during the first half of the eighteenth century. 'sGravesande introduced his reference to Newton's rules for philosophy with the intention of explaining how to proceed in order to find the regularities of the motions of the bodies and to generalize them as laws of motion: "It should be noted as well that in the enquiry of these laws the rules of Newtonian method shall be followed accurately; these rules are founded on the axiom we have already established." 26 It is worth noting that, in his translation, Mutis emphasized the need of applying Newton's rules accurately (con toda exactitud), because such an emphasis is not present in 'sGravesande's version. This shows that Mutis was convinced of the utility of Newton's rules in the study of nature and, in consequence, he promoted them as the only legitimate method to achieve a diligent study of any natural phenomena.
Mutis' use of 'sGravesande's theological foundation of Newton's rules for philosophy in his lectures on physics reveals that Mutis was interested in supporting his presentation of Newton's methodology on theological principles, more precisely, on the idea that, by discovering the laws of motion that God created, it is possible to discern his providence. After explaining the theological foundation of Newton's rules for philosophy, 'sGravesande presents the rules as Newton proposed them at the beginning of Book III of the Principia. 27 In the original version of the Physices elementa mathematica, 'sGravesande used the rules as a conclusion of Chapter I where he determines the subject and scope of physics. Then, he proceeded to explain the general properties of bodies and how they determine the qualities that we can perceive of them by postulating different experiments and mathematical demonstrations. Conversely, in Mutis' translated version, three scholia follow immediately after the rules; these scholia aimed to explain Newton's rules in detail. In Mutis'
interpretation of them, it is possible to see a clear anti-Cartesian tone, expressed in the emphasis on 15 the necessity of explaining natural phenomena by true and sufficient causes. This is intertwined with a limited interpretation of the logical and ontological consequences of Newton's rules as they were implied, for instance, in the fact that Mutis did not refer to the ideoque connecting Rule I and Rule II in Newton's version of the rules published in the second and third edition of the Principia. 28 Newton's doctrine, on the other hand, is just partially accepted, apparently as an exercise in the same anti-systemic spirit that Mutis praised:
Newton has been the only one who has described the nature, figure, workings, causes, movements and all the effects of all terrestrial and celestial objects and has brought the light with his experiments and meditations to the most recent philosophers, geometers and astronomers, especially to the English (…) In consequence, how cannot I be a Newtonian, dear listener, seeing the importance of the truths, the efficacy of demonstration, the weight of the experience and in short, the freedom to philosophize honoring the human mind? However, I am not a Newtonian similar to those that consider forbidden to recognize other Philosophers who have promoted aspects of Natural Philosophy with his observations, experiments, vigils and works. And even though I prefer to move away from the great Newton in some recent discoveries, I am no less Newtonian for this sake (…) Indeed, those Philosophers that, merely based on the effects and putting aside all hypotheses, try to deduce the arguments following the virtuous Newtonian method; these truly follow Newton's steps and are Newtonians in a sound way, contrary to those that only rest upon the master's authority. 29 Mutis' Newtonianism is loyal to Newton's "way of philosophizing" and, as we shall see, to the metaphysical and epistemological claims implied in it. In fact, Mutis is less attached to Newton's doctrines, even though he exhibits a great enthusiasm and reasonable knowledge of them. Wolffian mechanics. In general, these manuscripts reveal that Mutis was deeply interested in teaching on natural laws and Newton's characterization of attractive forces as they were applied to study the corpuscular constitution of bodies and to the motion of bodies in conic sections. Likewise, these manuscripts present forces framed in the theological foundation of the laws of nature and the application of mathematics to the natural philosophy that, as we mentioned in the previous section, underlies Mutis' argumentative structure. In particular, in Knowledge required…, Mutis explains the motion of a body in an ellipse as the result of the application of both a projective force (fuerza de proyección) -inertial-and a centripetal force. In this manuscript, Mutis (1) argues that the centripetal force accelerating a body traversing an ellipse should be drawn towards one focus of the ellipse; (2) he considers the fact that, in elliptical motions, centripetal and inertial forces should be in equilibrium; 17 and (3) he applies the mathematical analysis directly to the planetary motion. In so doing, he treated the subject with geometrical demonstrations, applying it to planetary motion. Similarly, the manuscript resembles different passages of Newton's Principia -especially Section VI of Book I and Propositions I through VIII of Book III-, in which Newton discusses the motions of bodies in conic sections, the forces required for their production, and the application of mathematical models to the phenomena of motion of heavenly bodies. 37 Mutis' appropriation of Newton's experimental physics appears in his lectures directed to wide social audiences; it is not derived from efforts to struggle with Newton's own claims in technical issues. Being a physician interested in drawing up a Botanical Expedition, Mutis' interest in technical problems of astronomy or natural philosophy were mainly related to his teaching during the 1760s-1770s. However, all the public statements from his arrival in New Granada until his death, his textbooks and notes intended for education defended the "Newtonian or experimental" philosophy, its foundations, its historical development and the benefits that the Kingdom will derive from its implementation as a collective and royal-supported effort.
In order to detail these elements of Mutis' Newtonianism, we will provide an analysis of his conception of Newtonian philosophy as a useful knowledge. However, it is necessary, to introduce
Mutis' specific claim that knowledge is useful by Divine commandment; in this, Newtonian philosophy appears on the stage. Philip II who, looking forward to admiring the valuable natural goods of New Spain and no less concerned with promoting the Good for humanity resulting therefrom thanks to the abundant discoveries of some medicinal and mineral goods, sent the wise Dr. Hernández, his Physician, with adequate resources for the Real Project. 41 
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From the previous quotation it is also evident that Mutis was not only trying to align his project with Hernández's; he was also trying to align Carlos III's new reign with Felipe II's -a reign then remembered as the time when the Spanish Empire reached its highest level of power and influence all over the world. Mutis suggested that an integral part of a successful and adequate ruling includes the promotion of science and in particular of botanical expeditions to find "medicinal and mineral goods." However, Mutis goes on, these early attempts to consolidate expeditions to Spanish dominions in America were frustrated by the "Spanish lethargy" which put its scientific development behind in comparison with other nations. 42 In spite of this, Mutis considered that Spain was then experiencing a rebirth after the war with Portugal and Great Britain, not only because the sovereign had time to improve his Kingdom, but also because he was an experienced King, having reigned for many years in Sicily:
Now that your Majesty has seen the fruit of your fatigue in the solid peace that has been recently established, the sages shall consider your Majesty diligently dedicated to the complete reestablishment of Sciences, Arts and Trade; in this your Majesty will achieve the same happiness and skill that he has achieved in making happy, wise and respectable his other Kingdom. 43 For Mutis, the King's dedication to promote natural knowledge was an obvious consequence of the duties all the rulers of civilized nations should observe. If Spain had no significant reputation for promoting natural knowledge it was because of the wars, but it was the obvious intention of a generous ruler to make of his Kingdom a "wise and respectable" one. Despite that all rulers of the "civilized nations" realized the importance of this endeavor, Mutis stressed that in the Spanish case the situation was more important and pressing, because of the extension of the realm and the richness, variety, and utility of the "treasures" therein.
Nobody knows better than your Majesty about the immortal glory for yourself which shall come of this glorious endeavor skillfully performed, because no other nation than 23 Spain is concerned with the knowledge and recognition of the admirable productions with which the Divine Providence has enriched the extensive domains of those who are fortunate to live under the rule of your Majesty in this New World. 44 This promotion of science shall place Spain among the civilized nations and, in consequence, shall improve the glory of the sovereign. This passage also highlights a connection between the New World and the right to exploit its natural resources. Though Mutis was persistent in the first argument, it relies heavily upon the King's personal attitudes and ultimately depends on his will. If he wanted to be considered a wise and generous King, he was called upon to promote arts and sciences, including the exploration of the rich flora of New Granada. Arts and sciences, after all, are related to trade and commerce. However, for Mutis himself, the promotion of arts and sciences and the connected exploitation of the natural resources, was more than a choice of the sovereign: it was a duty imposed by God's design of the world and, in this sense, it was unavoidable. It is God's design to have was more precious than all the gold and silver that the Spaniards had obtained from the New World. 45 Despite the bark of Quina's tree had proved to be exceptionally effective as a febrifuge, 46 Quina had been discredited in Spain at Mutis' times, because bark of bad quality or other barks confused with Quina had circulated in Europe. However, it was still somewhat valued in Europe, and Mutis pinned his hopes on the discovery of new sources of it since his arrival in New Granada. Because of the proximity to Peru and the oral reports of locals that they had caught sight of similar trees near to the hillsides of Bogotá, Mutis felt confident that he was going to discover the bark. This happened in 1772, according to Mutis himself. 47 Bearing this in mind, he wrote to the King in his 1763/64 requests:
[The Quina] A medicine so admirable that competes for being greater than the others, among the few known antidotes, entrusted by the Divine Providence to the hands of your Majesty for the universal Good of mankind (…) will be scarce at the third century of its happy discovery if your Majesty does not rule about it in due course. 48 For Mutis, natural resources had a theological meaning. Following this thread, Quina was then considered one of the highest manifestations of God's power and generosity, because of its admirable properties. In a similar way in which for Newton celestial movements explicitly exhibited the wisdom and power of God, plants and trees -and Quina in particular-had a theological meaning for Mutis:
The Divine Providence had conceded us generously four very different varieties of medicinal Quina and every one of them has different virtues in its own way. His generosity dispensed them to us with positive signs of their abundance in relation to their virtues against the diseases to which every one must be applied, balancing the production and distribution of the medicine with the need of it, in order to reveal in this inestimable benefit that seal of number, weight, and measure which uncovers an omnipotent hand in all his works. 49 Not only were the properties of Quina a natural resource that humans should use for their own benefit.
Natural resources have a purpose in the Divine plan in which humans are meant to reveal God's generosity from the "positive signs" he had left spread over nature. These "positive signs," as we 25 shall see, can be only discerned by experiments. The reference to God's intervention in terms of "that seal of number, weight, and measure" is recurrent in Mutis' writings as an equivalent to the Galilean motto that nature is written in mathematical characters. 50 Accordingly, botanical explorations are not only desirable but also necessary in order to reach the equilibrium between disease and medicine, revealing God's plan. In other words, the botanical researches are not only wanted in order to heal but, on the contrary, because healing by using medicinal plants is part of God's plan. In consequence, humans should not only use plants, and by extension nature, for their own benefits: they must.
Science, then, cannot be but useful and usable knowledge by divine decree. This sense of duty and the usefulness of science displayed in Mutis' arguments are not present in Newton's writings.
If natural resources are part of a divine plan, then humans are expected to have responsibility in finding the proper way to establish the balance between disease and health using medicines or, in general terms, to use rightly the goods through which God exerts his power to fulfil his commandment. Humans have a central role in the divine plan; they have to explore nature to find medicines and the causes, connections, and properties of natural phenomena. In the case of medicine, the perfect match between a disease and a medicine is to be uncovered through botanical and chemical researches by he who manages God's resources: the King and his subjects. The subtle but clear demand that Mutis put forward to the King in his representation of 1763/64 and to which he referred to in other writings has a theological root.
In addition, the fact that God entrusted this resource only to the King of Spain by spreading the Quina exclusively in America, reinforces his unavoidable and direct responsibility. Mutis offers himself to help the King with such a heavy burden: "The useful Quina, a treasure only conceded to the domains of your Majesty, in whose hand is entrusted to distribute it to the other nations in the same way that the Dutch distributed Ceylon's cinnamon (…) will be confidently, easily and rightly handled when my observations reach the public." 51 In the following section, it will be clearer how
Mutis came to consider himself as playing a central role in this endeavor. 26 The Quina is just the most obvious example of the required intervention of the King as administrator of divine resources. However, further unknown resources that God may have deposited in the lands of the New World were waiting to be discovered and used for the benefit and welfare of humanity but also to accomplish the divine plan:
America, in whose fortunate land the Creator deposited infinite goods worthy of admiration, has reached its name not only for its gold, silver, precious stones and other treasures hidden in its womb; also produces on its surface, for trade and utility, exquisite dyes which industry will find in the plants; the cochinilla, abundant in this Kingdom, though not farmed because of the indifference of the natives of this land; the precious wax of a bush named laurelito and that coming from the Palm tree; many glues, that can be used in the Arts; very valued woods for instruments and furniture; finally produces, for the Good of mankind, many other trees, herbs, resin and balsams.
We have a long way until we know all of this; and what is most valued, we have a long way until we know how to use what we already have discovered. 52 If the King was responsible for supporting the exploration and distribution of natural resources, because God entrusted them to him science is but usable knowledge to fulfil this plan; in Mutis version, useful science is his Newtonian philosophy -and he, himself-a proper instrument to achieve this end. were in the audience, as well as members of the local elite of creoles and students, according to his own account. 56 The "Speech" is an abridgement of philosophical and methodological issues that Mutis developed elsewhere. However, it is a crucial piece because it is a general exposition and defense of the philosophical and methodological issues rooted in Newton's work, intended for a nonspecialist public and directed against the Peripatetic teachings widely spread in Santa Fé's educational atmosphere. The "Speech" relates sciences -and foremost, mathematics-with the education of young people and with the development of the colony.
Mathematics and observation: the virtues of the Newtonian philosopher
In Mutis' use, both in the "Speech" and in the Elements, mathematics refer to: (1) the proper language to understand nature, because it was used by God when creating the world, establishing the order and harmony grasped by the human mind in the regularity of the laws of nature; this meaning has ontological and theological consequences; (2) a way to conduct reasoning (more geometrico) that can be applied outside the domain of quantitative studies, improving the process of enquiry in any area and preventing the mind from making mistakes; (3) the specific study of quantity, discrete and continuous, by means of comparing "all that can be augmented or reduced." The way to proceed in the specific domain of quantity can be extended to "other matters," giving rise then to "mixed Mathematics" or "Physico-Mathematical sciences." 57 Though the third and the second senses may appear quite similar, they actually refer to different nuances of the term. In the second sense, mathematics is conceived in terms of analytic and synthetic ways to proceed from experience and observations to general laws of nature that can be extended, for example, to medicine or botany; in the third, the specific methods and procedures of mathematics are applied not only to discrete and continual magnitudes, such as numbers and figures, but also to letters and signs, as it is done in specious arithmetic (algebra) or in calculus. In other words in the more geometrico sense, mathematics provides an order for reasoning, while in the third one it is a way to compute ("measure")
things by their signs, giving rise to mixed mathematics. In this third sense, Mutis advanced his ideas In this sense, Mutis concludes that although ancient mathematicians divided mathematics into arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy, modern mathematicians have reconsidered such 30 classification, thus establishing a simpler division between pure and mixed mathematics; being the latter the field of application of mathematics to the study of nature. In Mutis' words, Pure mathematics considers quantity in itself, not including the consideration of any accident or sensible affection. These are arithmetic and geometry, both universal (…)
Mixed-mathematics, or non-pure, considers dressed quantity and in company with some accident or affection [illeg.]; and because sensible affections belong to natural philosophy or physics, they are called physico-mathematical parts. 60 Mutis related mathematics and physics by claiming that the latter provides its subject of study to the mixed mathematics as it studies natural bodies and natural phenomena known by observations and experiments. Arguably, this idea is founded on his conception that nature has been created in a mathematical manner, which, as we suggested in the previous section, is inherited from diverse traditions of the seventeenth century which Mutis regardless identified as Newton's experimental physics. This point is particularly important because it reveals that, in the lectures following his Speech and Elements, Mutis presented mathematics as a theoretical and practical field, narrowly related to physics.
Nevertheless, Mutis argued that in order to study nature from a mathematical point of view, the natural philosopher needed to know the theoretical principles underlying pure mathematics:
"Before going deeper into the doctrine of the physico-mathematics it is required to be perfectly instructed in pure mathematics." 61 Such a characterization of the process required to study mixed mathematics reveals that Mutis conceived his lectures on mathematics with an instrumental purpose as a foundation to teach the theoretical elements to his students, for them to be capable of studying nature under the precepts of Newton. This is particularly important as it reveals that Mutis' ultimate purpose with his lectures was connected with the enterprise that motivated him to travel to New Granada in the first place, the botanical expedition, and with its theological foundation.
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On the other hand, mathematics, in the first sense, is the cornerstone of sciences. The logical outcome of this foundational sense is that from cultivating it in the third sense, it can provide a way to account for natural phenomena. On the other hand, by extending its methods to other domains -as described in the second and third senses -more utilities are revealed: the improvement of the ability to reason rightly, the preservation of life, the improvement of navigation and exploration of unknown seas and lands, for example. For Mutis, the foundation of mathematics and the cause of its capability to account for natural phenomena are ultimately based on theological considerations:
When God created the world -this so wonderful machine that we shall never live enough to admire sufficiently-seems to have formed the high design to implement mathematical laws. Everything was created by number, weight and measure with an order so constant that they shall remain until some day (…) Not in vain a wise man said that the World is a large book and, though open to all, just a few can read it, because it is written with ciphers and mathematical characters. 62 In the language of the mechanical philosophy current in seventeenth-century Europe and well known to Mutis, the world was conceived as a machine, whose processes can be explained in terms of mathematical laws, because God seems to have turned to numbers during the creation; in other words, the world is an exercise of God's knowledge of mathematics. In consequence, it constitutes the proper way to understand "this so wonderful machine." Interestingly, Mutis encompassed this theologicallybased conception of the relationship between mathematics and physics with some religious considerations that can be identified with the theological purposes underpinning the Botanical Expedition. These considerations are reflected in the fact that the knowledge of God's actions allowed humans to determine the best manner to adore him; a relationship that resembles Mutis' presentation of the method of analysis and synthesis as we described it.
Here, it is important to stress that for Mutis the mathematical structure of the creation includes natural history and medicine, as they were related to both chemical and physiological phenomena that But if the world is designed following such wise and manifest laws, how important is it for the man looking for knowledge to set aside a short time to the contemplation of things entering through senses, as the most adequate means to properly praise the Creator? Atheism had not progressed and the spirit of so many barbarous nations had not degraded to such terms that would have embarrassed the lofty status of human nature in all ages. 64 Indeed, Mutis considered that the main business of natural philosophy, and of knowledge in general, is to serve as solid foundation for natural religion and moral philosophy, leading humans in a "very agreeable way to the high knowledge of the Author of Nature and Creator of the Universe"; because studying nature amounts to leading to the knowledge of the wonderful works of that Sovereign
Creator, who allows himself to be known, in part, from the visible things. 65 As ambiguous as the expression "Newtonian methodology" can be -Newton's methodological guidelines and procedures in the Principia and the Opticks are not a coherent and unified set of rules 33 or strategies; we can note differences between what Newton calls "deduction from phenomena" in the Principia and the demonstrative parts of the Opticks, on the one hand; and the exploration and speculation about hypothetical statements in the Queries, on the other. According to the "Speech" and the Elements, Mutis firmly identified "the method of Newton" with the former, supporting
Newton's famous statement "hypotheses non fingo." For Mutis, Newton "never decided to suppose not even one of his favorite principles: he never made a supposition, because he was not concerned with the establishment of a system." 66 The result is that Mutis aligned Newton's methodology and his own with the analytical and synthetic style which he also reads in the Opticks -except for the analogical reasoning we have explained before, justified by the nature of the subject, but Newtonian for his deduction from the rules for philosophizing.
In the introduction to Elements, Mutis claims that "the Book of nature is only studied now by means of observation and experience establishing reasoning in the safer way of mathematical demonstration." Observation and experience or "the contemplation of things entering through senses"
is the starting point of any enquiry. In Mutis' view, mathematics constitutes a way to infer causes from the given phenomena and to demonstrate these conclusions, but it cannot postulate the existence of the entities; these must be uncovered by experience. On the contrary, mathematics is the way by means of which, starting from observation and experiments, we can "rise to the discovery of the causes by their effects, and to explain the effects by their causes. For this he [Newton] used a sublime Geometry which was always his guide in his delicate and prickly enquiries." Mutis introduced
Newton's method of analysis and synthesis in Elements in order to explain how it allows the study of nature without the problems of the speculative-deductive systems, by establishing a relationship between mathematics and natural philosophy. He established such a relationship in both methodological and conceptual levels, arguing that the principles of the geometrical method of analysis and synthesis should guide the study of nature to discover the laws ruling the motion of bodies. 34 In Mutis' view, the most important of Newton's teachings was that "it was necessary to consult nature itself, to follow all its steps in all its manifest operations and to extract from it womb the mysteries it hides from us." The uncovering of the causes of phenomena must start from their attentive observation by applying the analytical method, not from principles supposed or deduced from other principles. However, experimental findings are not only the departure point for launching researches but also, following Newton's Rule IV, a permanent referent for the philosopher during the enquiry. For Mutis, this is crystal-clear in Newton's work: "He never wanted to hear any objection against an evident experience, even though it were deduced from the subtlest reflection of metaphysics." Accordingly, experience is the link between the findings of knowledge and the actual structure of phenomena to be explained. In this sense, experience is the touchstone of the mind. This is so because our knowledge of the world ultimately rests on the way God decided to arrange nature; in this sense, our knowledge is always limited. 67 For Mutis, empiricism is based on a particular conception of God's relation with his works. In translating 'sGravesande's interpretation of Newton's arguments in the "Scholium Generale" to the Principia, Mutis considers that experience and observation is the only way to the true study of nature. In his view, a God acting through constant laws in nature supports the relation between knowledge and experience. In order to justify this, Mutis included in his translation a set of definitions found in Book I of the Physices Elementa Mathematica in which 'sGravesande describes Newton's methodology in the Principia: natural things are bodies (Def. 1) and the sum of all bodies is the universe (Def. 2). Natural phenomena are "the movements and all situation of natural bodies not depending immediately upon the action of an intelligent being," 68 that is, their movement is not caused by the immediate action of God (3). Voluntary movements are part of natural phenomena, but it is necessary to distinguish between those movements depending on our own will and those depending on other causes (4). All these movements follow specific and determinate laws (5). Even those phenomena that we consider arising from chance, such as the growth of plants, could be explained in terms of laws if we had at hand sufficient observations 35 to discover regularities and uncover causal bonds. When we discover that the entire world is subject to laws, we find the foundation of all reasoning of physics (Def. 7) in this supreme principle: "Axiom.
The Creator of the universe rules all things with specific and constant laws, appropriate to his wisdom, arising spontaneously from the very nature of things" (Def. 8). Physics then is the enquiry into, and explanation of, natural phenomena, that is, it uncovers and exposes the causes of phenomena (Def.
9). In examining these causes, the body in general must be examined and, after this, it should be asked "what rules God wanted to be executed in these motions. These rules are called laws of nature" (Def.
10). This is why "a law of nature is that rule or constant norm, according to which God wanted these movements to be performed" (Def. 11). In consequence, a law of nature is, from the human point of view, a simple effect that appears in all occasions as one and the same and whose cause is unknown to us, whenever we cannot discover that it arises from a law already known; because they can arise as well from any other law simpler, but concealed from us (Def. 12). However, in what concerns to us, we do not care that one thing depends immediately on God's will or that it will be known to us by any other mediate cause that we ignore (Def. 13). The conclusion of all these 13 definitions is that "it is then evident that we cannot know the laws of nature but by examining natural phenomena" (Def.
14). 69 Hitherto we have shown how Mutis appropriates and defends "the method of Newton," developing some methodological conclusions and theological foundations not present in Newton's works. This appropriation, as we argued, conceives Newtonian philosophy as a useful science. This conception also imposes a moral exigency for the philosopher sketched in Newton's theological and historical studies known to Mutis. He subsumes these moral virtues of the philosopher under his own understanding of him as an executioner of God's plan. In other words, because knowing the world amounts to being a servant of God's plan, a material executor of divine designs -a kind of demiurge-, the philosopher must be the bearer of moral virtues required by his role in the theological ordering of the world: "[To the knowledge of the Creator] are to be oriented the sight of the philosopher (…) 36 because it is certain that it is not possible to contemplate and admire the order of such an excellent system without at the same time being part of the general harmony of nature in order to arise to the Creator." 70 Mutis connects a set of virtues with the experimental or Newtonian philosopher: diligence, patience, humility; in so doing, he reinterprets Newton's methodological and epistemological statements as implying a moral condition required to follow the adequate path that shall led to fulfilling the divine designs: "In order to reach such high ends, the Philosopher may not be precipitated in his discoveries; rather he must follow his path with due humility and the highest precaution in these matters." The history of philosophy contains plenty of examples of the natural inclination of humans to fall into superstition; this happened when they "applied themselves to penetrate the hidden mysteries of nature without the due precautions." 71 In this way, experimental or Newtonian philosophy is restricted to those who do not expect to build by themselves a complete system of the world, but to those who are willing to contribute, even to a small measure, to the hard task of understanding natural effects by their causes. In so doing, they shed light on and complete divine designs, despite the limitations of the human mind.
The knowledge we have of nature, though imperfect, is always useful to represent to us that Sovereign Power, which dominates all things and though never weakens. This is the main end of a philosopher; and in order to reach it, he must not hasten our discoveries creating systems to waste the time, leading to impiety and atheism, or to form dangerous opinions on the divinity and the universe. 72 This moral exigency should not to be confused with the moral consequences of natural philosophy to which Newton referred at the end of the Opticks and in other works on historical studies and natural religion known to Mutis. 73 On one hand, the philosopher ought to be humble to reach knowledge; on the other, the complete system of natural philosophy would provide or at least indicate a moral philosophy by indicating our duties towards each other. Bearing in mind the limits of knowledge and the difficulties in establishing firm conclusions from experiences, the philosopher has to be patient 37 and dedicated; his sight should be directed to a divine end, not to his own glory. The immensity and complexity of the world cannot be grasped all at once, but by the experimental work without any individual interests. In opposition to this attitude, Mutis links the attitudes of those who pursue the fame and look to immortalize their names with the construction of complete systems and ambitious explanations without appealing to experience and mathematics. The result of this attitude is the construction of systems leading to atheism; if natural philosophy is the foundation of religion, then a false natural philosophy would lead to a false religion or even to atheism, a formula present in Newton's works and widely spread among supporters of experimental philosophy in other latitudes, mainly in Britain. 74 Through these religious and moral derivations of his Newtonianism, inherited and reinterpreted from Newton's own works, Mutis reinforces his arguments in favor of the Newtonian philosophy for having pious implications supporting the true religion and, in this sense, responsive to the challenges of a useful science for the Spanish America. it is publicly known in this Kingdom (…) that I wanted to throw myself into such an arduous task. 75 He, in his view, was concerned solely with "the glory and Universal Good of the Nation," leaving aside his "particular interests." Mutis himself was an adequate bearer of the moral virtues and the Newtonian way required to advance in God's plan for America.
Conclusion
The traditional historiographies on the eighteenth-century New Granada have uncritically subsumed all the intellectual and cultural phenomena occurring in this corner of the Spanish Empire under the general label of "Enlightenment," concealing historical process such as the appropriation of 
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